Nicomachean Ethics

Name: Nicomachean Ethics
Author: Aristotle

Aristotle · Translated by F. H. Peters

English · c. 4th century BC · Philosophy

Aristotle's treatise on happiness, virtue, friendship, and the good life, read as a foundational work of Western moral philosophy.

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Preface
Editor’s Note
The End
Section IEvery art and every kind of inquiry, and likewise every act and…
Section IIIf then in what we do there be some end which we wish for on its own…
Section IIIWe must be content if we can attain to so much precision in our…
Section IVSince—to resume—all knowledge and all purpose aims at some good, what…
Section VLet us now take up the discussion at the point from which we…
Section VIDismissing these views, then, we have now to consider the “universal…
Section VIILeaving these matters, then, let us return once more to the question…
Section VIIIWe must not be satisfied, then, with examining this starting-point or…
Section IXThis has led people to ask whether happiness is attained by learning…
Section XAre we, then, to call no man happy as long as he lives, but to wait…
Section XIPassing now from this question to that of the fortunes of descendants…
Section XIIThese points being settled, we may now inquire whether happiness is…
Section XIIISince happiness is an exercise of the vital faculties in accordance…
Moral Virtue
Section IExcellence, then, being of these two kinds, intellectual and moral…
Section IIBut our present inquiry has not, like the rest, a merely speculative…
Section IIIThe pleasure or pain that accompanies the acts must be taken as a…
Section IVBut here we may be asked what we mean by saying that men can become…
Section VWe have next to inquire what excellence or virtue is.
Section VIWe have thus found the genus to which virtue belongs; but we want to…
Section VIIBut it is not enough to make these general statements [about virtue…
Section VIIIThere are, as we said, three classes of disposition, viz. two kinds…
Section IXWe have sufficiently explained, then, that moral virtue is moderation…
The Will
Section IVirtue, as we have seen, has to do with feelings and actions. Now…
Section IINow that we have distinguished voluntary from involuntary acts, our…
Section IIINow, as to deliberation, do we deliberate about everything, and may…
Section IVWish, we have already said, is for the end: but whereas some hold…
Section VWe have seen that, while we wish for the end, we deliberate upon and…
The Several Moral Virtues and Vices
Section VIWe have already said that courage is moderation or observance of the…
Section VIIFear is not excited in all men by the same things, but yet we…
Section VIIICourage proper, then, is something of this sort.
Section IXCourage is concerned, as we said, with feelings both of confidence…
Section XAfter courage, let us speak of temperance, for these two seem to be…
Section XINow, of our desires or appetites some appear to be common to the…
Section XIIProfligacy seems to be more voluntary than cowardice.
The Several Moral Virtues and Vices—Continued
Section ILiberality, of which we will next speak, seems to be moderation in…
Section IIOur next task would seem to be an examination of magnificence. For…
Section IIIHigh-mindedness would seem from its very name (μεγαλοψυχία) to have…
Section IVBut, it appears (as we said at the outset) that there is also a…
Section VGentleness is moderation with respect to anger. But it must be noted…
Section VIIn the matter of social intercourse, i.e. the living with others and…
Section VIIThe moderation which lies between boastfulness and irony (which…
Section VIIIAgain, since relaxation is an element in our life, and one mode of…
Section IXShame (αἰδώς) cannot properly be spoken of as a virtue; for it is…
Justice
Section IWe now have to inquire about justice and injustice, and to ask what…
Section IIWe have now to examine justice in that sense in which it is a part of…
Section IIIThe unjust man [in this limited sense of the word], we say, is…
Section IVIt remains to treat of the other form, viz. that which is just in the…
Section VSome people, indeed, go so far as to think that simple requital is…
Section VIBut since it is possible for a man to do an act of injustice without…
Section VIINow, of that which is just as between citizens, part is natural, part…
Section VIIINow that we have ascertained what is just and what is unjust, we may…
Section IXBut it may be doubted whether we have sufficiently explained what it…
Section XWe have next to speak of equity and of that which is equitable, and…
Section XIThe foregoing discussion enables us to answer the question whether it…
The Intellectual Virtues
Section IWe said above that what we should choose is neither too much nor too…
Section IINow, the faculties which guide us in action and in the apprehension…
Section IIILet us describe these virtues then, starting afresh from the…
Section IVThat which is variable includes that which man makes and that which…
Section VIn order to ascertain what prudence is, we will first ask who they…
Section VIScience is a mode of judging that deals with universal and necessary…
Section VIIThe term σοφία (wisdom) is sometimes applied in the domain of the…
Section VIIIAnd in fact statesmanship and prudence are the same faculty, though…
Section IXInquiry and deliberation are not the same; for deliberation is a…
Section XThe faculty of intelligence or sound intelligence, in respect of…
Section XIJudgment (what we mean when we speak of a man of kindly judgment, or…
Section XIIBut here an objection may be raised. “What is the use of them?” it…
Section XIIIThis suggests a further consideration of moral virtue; for the case…
Characters Other Than Virtue and Vice
Section IAt this point we will make a fresh start and say that the undesirable…
Section IIBut in what sense, it may be objected, can a man judge rightly when…
Section IIIWe have, then, to inquire (1) whether the incontinent man acts with…
Section IVSo much, then, for the question whether the incontinent man knows or…
Section VWhile some things are naturally pleasant (of which some are pleasant…
Section VIThe next point we have to consider is that incontinence in anger is…
Section VIIWith regard to the pleasures and pains of touch and taste, and the…
Section VIIIAgain, a profligate man, as we said, is not given to remorse, for he…
Section IXNow, who is to be called continent? he who abides by any kind of…
Section XIt is impossible for the same man to be at once prudent and…
Of Pleasure
Section XIThe consideration of pleasure and pain also falls within the scope of…
Section XIIBut that these arguments do not prove that pleasure is not good, or…
Section XIIIBut all admit that pain is a bad thing undesirable; partly bad in…
Section XIVThose who say that though some pleasures are very desirable—to wit…
Friendship or Love
Section IAfter the foregoing a discussion of friendship will naturally follow…
Section IIPerhaps these difficulties will be cleared up if we first ascertain…
Section IIIBut these three motives are specifically different from one another…
Section IVThe friendship of which pleasure is the motive bears some resemblance…
Section VBut just as with regard to the virtues we distinguish excellence of…
Section VIMorose men and elderly men are less apt to make friends in proportion…
Section VIIBut, besides these, there is another kind of friendship, in which the…
Section VIIIMost people seem, from a desire for honour, to wish to be loved…
Section IXIt seems, as we said at the outset, that the subject-matter and…
Section XNow, of constitutions there are three kinds, and an equal number of…
Section XIIn each of these forms of government friendship has place to the same…
Section XIIAll friendship, as we have already said, implies association; but we…
Section XIIIThere are three kinds of friendship, as we said at the outset, and in…
Section XIVQuarrels occur also in unequal friendships; for sometimes each claims…
Friendship or Love—Continued
Section IIn all dissimilar friendships it is proportionate exchange that…
Section IIThere are some further questions that here suggest themselves, such…
Section IIIAnother difficult question is, whether we should or should not break…
Section IVFriendly relations to others, and all the characteristics by which…
Section VWell-wishing seems to be friendly, but is not friendship: for we may…
Section VIUnanimity [or unity of sentiment] also seems to be an element in…
Section VIIBenefactors seem to love those whom they have benefited more than…
Section VIIIAnother question which is raised is, whether we ought most to love…
Section IXAnother disputed question is whether a happy man needs friends or not.
Section XAre we to make as many friends as possible? or, as in the case of…
Section XIIs it in prosperity or adversity that we most need friends? For under…
Section XIILovers delight above all things in the sight of each other, and…
Pleasure
Section IOur next business, I think, should be to treat of pleasure. For…
Section IIEudoxus thought pleasure was the good, because he saw that all…
Section IIIAgain, even though pleasure is not a quality, it does not follow that…
Section IVAs to the nature or quality of pleasure, we shall more readily…
Section VAnd from this it seems to follow that pleasures differ in kind, since…
Conclusion
Section VINow that we have discussed the several kinds of virtue and friendship…
Section VIIBut if happiness be the exercise of virtue, it is reasonable to…
Section VIIIThe life that consists in the exercise of the other kind of virtue is…
Section IXNow that we have treated (sufficiently, though summarily) of these…

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Source text: Standard Ebooks (original); CC0 1.0 (public domain dedication). Translation by F. H. Peters. Re-typeset by ClassicBooksPress.com.

Nicomachean Ethics

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